Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Spafford v. Granite Credit Union : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Iris M. Spafford; Earl S. Spafford; Appelants Pro-Se .
Anthony C. Kaye; Matthew L. Moncur; Ballard Spahr; Attorneys for Appellee .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Spafford v. Granite Credit Union, No. 201000086 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2701

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IRIS M. SPAFFORD AND EARL S.
SP AFFORD,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. 201000086-CA
District Court Case No.: 070911059

vs.
GRANITE CREDIT UNION,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE
HONORABLE TYRONE S. MEDLEY ON DECEMBER 30, 2009

Iris M. Spafford
Earl S. Spafford
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121
Telephone: (801)278-5909
Appellants Pro-Se

Anthony C. Kaye (#5073)
Matthew L. Moncur (#9894)
BALLARD SPAHR LLP

One Utah Center, Suite 800
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2221
Telephone: (801)531-3000
Facsimile: (801)531-3001
Attorneys for Appellee, Granite Credit
Union

UTAHAPPE^HOOORTS

OCT 1 2 » >
• MA o n o ^ m / i

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IRIS M. SPAFFORD AND EARL S.
SPAFFORD,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. 201000086-CA
District Court Case No.: 070911059

vs.
GRANITE CREDIT UNION,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE
HONORABLE TYRONE S. MEDLEY ON DECEMBER 30, 2009

Iris M. Spafford
Earl S. Spafford
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121
Telephone: (801) 278-5909
Appellants Pro-Se

Anthony C. Kaye (#5073)
Matthew L. Moncur (#9894)
BALLARD SPAHR LLP
One Utah Center, Suite 800
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2221
Telephone: (801)531-3000
Facsimile: (801)531-3001
Attorneys for Appellee, Granite Credit
Union

DMEAST #12984034 v3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A.

The Nature of the Case

3

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

3

C.

Statement of Facts

5

1.

Plaintiffs' Allegations

5

2.

GCU Did Not Breach Any Duty Owed to the Spaffords
Because the Property Is Not in a Dangerous or Defective
Condition

6

Procedural History

8

3.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

15

ARGUMENT

18

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
STRIKING THE SPAFFORDS' UNTIMELY EXPERT DISCLOSURE
OR the KEMP AFFIDAVIT
A.
B.

II.

18

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Striking the
Untimely Expert Disclosure and the Kemp Affidavit

19

Even if the District Court Erred in Striking the Spaffords' Untimely
Expert Disclosure, Such Error Was Harmless

23

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE SPAFFORDS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF
TIME TO DESIGNATE EXPERTS

DMEAST #12984034 v3

«

26

III.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
STRIKING PORTIONS OF THE SPAFFORD AFFIDAVIT AS
CONCLUSORY, STATING LEGAL CONCLUSIONS, AND
CONTAINING IMPROPER LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY

31

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF GCU

33

A.

The District Court Did Not Err in Granting GCU's Motion for
Summary Judgment Because There Were No Disputes of Material
Fact and GCU Was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law
1.

The Spaffords Bore the Burden of Establishing the Elements
of Their Claims and Failed to Meet that Burden

34

If the District Court Erred in Requiring Expert Testimony to
Establish the Elements of Breach and Causation, Such Error
Was Harmless

38

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID
NOT VIOLATE THE SPAFFORDS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

39

THE SPAFFORDS' ARGUMENT THAT GCU "ADOPTED AN
ADVOCACY ROLE ON BEHALF OF THE COURT" IN OPPOSING
THE SPAFFORDS' MOTION TO RECUSE OR DISQAULIFY IS
UNFOUNDED

41

2.

V.
VI.

A.

VII.

33

The Spaffords' Claim that GCU Assumed an Advocacy Role for the
District Court Lacks Any Evidential Basis

41

B.

GCU Had the Right to Oppose the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify

41

C.

The Spaffords' Claim that GCU Improperly Entered a General
Appearance for the District Court Violates Utah R. App. P. 24(k)

43

THE ASSOCIATE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE SPAFFORDS' MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE TYRONE S. MEDLEY
1.
2.

DMEAST #12984034 v3

44

The Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice Was Premised on Mere
Speculation and Legal Conclusions

45

The Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify Provided No Evidence
of Bias Stemming from an Extrajudicial Source

46

11

VIII. THE SPAFFORDS' BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE IT
VIOLATES RULE 24

47

CONCLUSION

48

EXHIBIT 1:
Lee v. Central Gulf Towing, L.L.C,
No. 04-1497, 2004 WL 2988478, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257 (E.D. La. December
9, 2004)

DMEAST#12984034 v3

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES

Binks v. Maughan,
2009 UT App 321 (Utah Ct. App. 2009)

46

Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins,
2009 UT 52, 215 P.3d 933

21, 22

Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc.,
200 F.R.D. 596 (S.D. Tex 2001)

25

Cafferty v. Taylor,
2006 UT App. 487, 2006 WL 3518529

20, 31

Capital Assets Financial Servs. v. Lindsay,
956 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

32

Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew,
297 S.E.2d 675 (Va. 1982)

35

Fox v. Brigham Young University,
, 2007 UT App. 406, 176 P.3d 446

passim

Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc.,
452 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2006)

24

Harris v. Beneficial Oklahoma, Inc.,
209 B.R. 990 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997)

32

In the Interest of A.M.,
2009 UT App. 118, 208 P.3d 1058

42

In re Affidavit of Bias,
947 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1997)

44, 45

In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge,
2003 UT 35, 81 P.3d 758

47

In re M.L.,
965 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

DMEAST #12984034 v3

2, 44, 45

iV

Jacobsen v. Thomas,
2008 UT App. 334

38

Johnson v. Gold's Gym,
2009 UT App. 76, 206 P.3d 304

2

Laney v. Fairview City,
2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007

40

Lee v. Central Gulf Towing, L.L.C.,
No. 04-1497, 2004 WL 2988478, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257 (E.D. La.
December 9, 2004)

28

Lippman v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co.,
2010 UT App. 89

22, 23

Lundahl v. Quinn,
2003 UT 11, 67 P.3d 1000

20

Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n,
767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988)

47

Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663

40

Mini Spas, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah,
733 P.2d 130 (Utah 1987)

29

Morton v. Continental Baking Co.,
938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997)

22

Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp. (In re General Determination of the Rights to
the Use of All the Water),
1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65

1

NatT Housing Indus., Inc. v. E. L. Jones Dev. Co.,
576 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)

35

Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs.,
467 P.2d 610 (Utah 1970)

35

Norton v. Blackham,
669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983)

32

Pete v. Youngblood,
2006 UT App 303, 141 P.3d 629

19

niUIFAST #17984034 v3

V

Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA,
2002 UT 42, 48 P.3d 941

38

Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, GMBH,
46 F.3d 1298 (3d. Cir. 1995)

28

Pipkin v. Haugen,
2003 UTApp. 216

39

Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc.,
2009 UT App 347, 222 P.3d 775

21

Poulis-Minott v. Smith,
388 F.3d 354 (1st Cir. 2004)

25

Poulsen v. Frear,
946 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997)

45, 46

Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller,
943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

35

Robb v. Anderton,
863 P.2d 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

18

Rukavina v. Sprague,
2007 UT App 331, 170 P.3d 1138

19

Schafir v. Harrigan,
879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

33, 34, 40

State v. Evans,
2001 UT 22

23

State v. Hollen.
2002 UT 35, 44 P.3d 794

18

State v. Rothlisberger,
2004 UT App. 226, 95 P.3d 1193

33

Stoddard v. Smith,
2001 UT 47, 27 P.3d 546

26

Tindlev v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist.
2005 UT 30, 116 P.3d 295

40

DMEAST #12984034 v3

vi

U.S. v. Nickl,
427 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2005)

46

V.K.W.v. State of Utah,
2003 UT App. 87, 67P.3dl037

18,31

Walker v. Hansen,
2003 UT App. 237, 74 P.3d 635

18

Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah,
2010 UT App 171, 235 P.3d 791

29

Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc.,
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975)

22

Williams v. Melby,
699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985)

34

Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah,
780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

35, 37

U T A H STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. §30-2-1 l(5)(a),(b)

34

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102

1

Utah Const. Art. I, § 11 (2010)

40

Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)

26

Utah R. Civ. P. 7

42

Utah R. App. P. 24

1, 18, 43, 47, 48

Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)

11,19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 29

Utah R. Civ. P. 29

29, 16, 27, 28

Utah R. App. P. 30(f)

28

Utah R. Civ. P. 37

15, 19, 21, 22, 23

Utah R. Civ. P. 56

32, 40

Utah R. Civ. P. 63

41, 42, 44

D M F A S T #1 ?QR4ftt4 \/^

vil

Utah

33

OTHER AUTHORITIES

42U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)

38

Fed. R. Civ. P. 29

28

United States Department of Justice, AW, \ uuiue mr Lilian nusuic^ev

38

DMEAST #12984034 v3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
While Appellee Granite Credit Union ("Appellee" or "GCU") will fully address
each of the six issues raised by Plaintiffs/Appellants Iris M. Spafford and Earl S. Spafford
(the "Appellants" or "Spaffords") in the Brief of Appellant ("Appellants' Brief), GCU
believes that the following statement of issues more accurately states the issues presented
by this appeal, and therefore submits the same in accordance with Utah R. App. P.
24(b)(1).
I.

Whether the District Court properly entered summary judgment in favor of

GCU in a case alleging an injury caused by dangerous and defective construction, design,
and maintenance of a portion of property owned by GCU given the failure of the
Spaffords to support their claims through admissible expert testimony on the issues of
duty and causation. A district court's ruling that there are no genuine issues of material
fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law is reviewed for correctness.
Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp. (In re General Determination of the Rights to the Use
of All the Water), 1999 UT 39, ^ 12, 982 P.2d 65, 69. This issue was preserved in the
District Court. (R. 428-515, 654-75.)
II.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in striking paragraphs 3, 4,

5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Affidavit of Earl S. Spafford, which paragraphs are

lay opinion testimony. A dioLi^ ^ouil ^ rulings with r ^ p c ^ ,o uncover) and „*iw
admissibility ofeviden.ee are reviewed on ai 1 abuse of discretion standard. Johnson v.
Gold_^Uyi.n, Jwwv 111 App. /u. "H ll, -00 l'..Jd "'»D I, .'Uu
v

I>

III.

• •

" •

i . *> 1 '. - ;

i UK

1111:•* KVJIII' ^wi;. pu^Li n! in lln.

!^ *

\\ heiber the 1 )i-.inct Cuuri abused IU discretion in denying the Spaffords'

motion for enlargement ol tin it lo designate expert witnesses, filed nearly four months

affidavit of Clarence Kemp, B.C.S.E., P.L., when such report was not timely served, the
Spaffords represented during discovery that thev h.*u1 yet to determine wh.~ the" wouV-

the scope of his untimeh RT>TI. A district court's rulings with respect to discovery ai id
the admissibili:

". idence are reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. Johnson,

2009 I J I App. 76 , lj 8, 206 I ' 3d at 306 I his issue was preserved in me 1;.. >i, „ * .»!il
("i

^

• ^ "'•••
IV.

1 788 819 )

Whether the Associate Presiding Judi?e ol me 1 bird Judicial District Court

properly denied the Spaffords' Motioi 11 .0 Disqiam •_ ^ ^ere such motion was premised on

evidence of bias stemming from extrajudicial sources. "I lie issue is reviewed for
correctness. See In re ML., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct App, 1998) ("The question of
whetl lerapart) " s affu h ivil allegh lg judicij il!: >ias is legally sufficiei it is a questlc n 1 of
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law."). This issue was preserved in the District Court. (R. 1155-1243, 1274-1323, 133437.)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations
that are determinative of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature of the Case,

On August 2, 2007, the Spaffords filed their Complaint against GCU, in which
they assert claims for negligence and loss of consortium premised on their contention that
property owned by GCU suffers from defects in design and construction, which the
Spaffords allege caused Mrs. Spafford to fall and suffer injuries on or about April 4,
2005. GCU denies the Spaffords' allegations and has produced uncontroverted expert
testimony establishing that its property is neither dangerous nor defective and that Mrs.
Spafford's alleged injuries were not caused by any breach of duty on the part of GCU.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

On August 2, 2007, the Spaffords commenced this personal injury action claiming
that Mrs. Spafford suffered an injury due to design and construction defects present on
GCU's property. GCU and the Spaffords, through their counsel, subsequently agreed to a
scheduling order, which was amended on multiple occasions. Under the final version of
the scheduling order, the deadline for service of the Spaffords' disclosure of expert
witnesses was May 15, 2009. The Spaffords did not serve their expert disclosure prior to

n n / I P A Q T ^ I O Q f l / i n ^ i l w^

1

subsequent 1\ entered appearances pro-se.
(in /August 3, 2009, more than two months after the deadline for service of the
Spaffords' expei I: - iti less disc losi u e ai id expert i epoi ts tl le Spaffoi ds se t v ed tl ic it
Disclosure of Expert Witness. GCU moved to strike this disclosure and moved for
sui nmary judgment, arguing, in part, that the Spaffords' claims failed as a matter of law
because they could i lot meci UK.., i .,;dcu oi cstdDn.>inh; .;^ exigence wi a defect in

GCU's motion for summary judgment and filed a motion seeking an enlargement of time
to designate expert witnesses OCT T moved to strike the two affidavits the Spaffords
si lbi i litted ii I oppc sitioi i to <

it: si u. i n i lai y )i idgi i lei it :»t I October 20. 2009,

The District Court held oral argument with respect to these motions on November 24,
2009, and on No\ ember 25. ?000. held a telephone hearing during which the District
Coi in: t granted GCI Ps i notioi I to sti ike tl le Spaffords' expei t disclosure and affidavits,
granted GCU's motion for summary i:i».ii.m MV

.\-

• ' * Sp.-iM« i '• - »••

: i to

enlarge time.
Oi I Decei nber I 2009, tl: le Spaf fords filed a Motioi I to Recuse or Disqualify
seeking disqualificatioi i of 1 1 le District Coi I:I t h ldge tl n : T h n u « ,: »bk I yi o:t le S I\ k dley
GCU filed a memorandum opposing this motion on D e ^ m b c r 1, 2009. On December
2 I, '009, Judge Paul G. Maughn, Associate Presiding Judge of the Third Judicial District
Coin I Khc "Asso-tiiilc IVsiiiiiir ,Ii '

d ,i [iu\\ - mini t mln deming the

Spaffords'Motion to Recuse or Di^uii- I,, v. Alter the Spaffords' Mo0
DME> ' S I # 12984034 \ 3

4

?

- -, .-

Disqualify was denied, the District Court entered a Judgment and Order with respect to
the motions considered during the hearing held on November 24, 2009.
C

Statement of Facts.
I.

1.

Plaintiffs' Allegations.

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that on April 4, 2005, Mrs. Spafford was

injured in a fall in the parking lot of the Granite Credit Union branch located at 6799 S.
900 E., Midvale, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 1-3.)
2.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege as follows:
7.
On or about April 4, 2005, Plaintiff [Mrs. Spafford]
went to the Granite Credit Union to conduct banking
business.
8.
At the time of the accident she was with her husband,
Earl Spafford, who was driving.
9.
The Spaffords pulled into the south side of the credit
union parking lot and parked in the last parking stall farthest
to the east next to the building.
10.
Ms. Spafford got out of the passenger side of the car
and walked forward to reach the sidewalk in front of the
parking stall.
II.
From this particular parking stall there is not enough
room for a passenger exiting their vehicle to step up onto the
south facing curb. Rather the passenger must step up on the
east facing curb which is what Ms. Spafford had to do.
12.
The curb is unmarked and is dangerous in that it is
uneven. The curb quickly begins to slant downward towards
the building so that when one is trying to step up onto the
curb the left foot must step up higher than the right foot by
several inches. To add to the unsafe condition of the area,
there is no handrail to block the area from pedestrians or to
assist a pedestrian with his/her balance in stepping up on the

DMEAST #12984034 v3

5

uneven walkway. Nor is there a warning to advise the patron
to be careful when stepping up.
13.
In addition a drain is located a few feet southeast of the
sidewalk area in the parking lot and the asphalt around the
drain slants downward toward the drain to allow the water to
flow into the drain. The problem the drain creates is that the
area close to the curb and where pedestrians must walk slants
back toward the drain requiring a customer to exert extra
effort to walk up to the curb.
14.
Ms. Spafford attempted to step up onto the eastside
curb of the sidewalk with her right foot. As she went to lift
her left foot, she did not get her foot up completely onto the
higher part of the curb. Ms. Spafford lost her balance and fell
backward toward the drain hitting her head on the asphalt of
the parking lot.
(R. 1-3.)
3.

Appellants allege that Mrs. Spafford suffered injuries as a result of her fall.

(R.3-4.)
4.

The Spaffords' complaint alleges the existence of "design and construction

defects" in the parking lot at the Property and that GCU "negligently and carelessly
permitted the parking lot to become and remain in a defective and dangerous condition."
(R.3-4.)
5.

The Spaffords' claims are premised on their allegation that GCU breached

its duty to maintain safe premises and to eliminate dangerous conditions and defects on
the Property, thus causing Mrs. Spafford's alleged injuries. (R. 3-4.)
2.
6.

GCU Did Not Breach Any Duty Owed to the Spaffords Because the
Property Is Not in a Dangerous or Defective Condition.

The Property was purchased by GCU and the Midvale Branch of Granite

Credit Union was constructed on the Property in approximately 1984. (R. 447, 459-64.)
DMEAST #12984034 v3
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7.

No significant changes have been made to the Property since its

construction. (R. 447, 459-64.)
8.

No modifications or changes have been made to the parking area or the

sidewalk/curb area of the Property since the date of Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall. (R. 447,
473.)
9.

On June 12, 2009, GCU timely served its Disclosure of Expert Witness,

identifying Larry Smiltneek, M.S., P.E., as an expert retained by GCU, and attaching
copies of Mr. Smiltneek's expert report. (R. 447, 488-507.)
10.

Mr. Smiltneek examined the Property on February 15, 2008. (R. 428-443,

11.

Mr. Smiltneek, in his report, offered his expert opinion as an engineer and

447.)

expert on accident investigation relating to the issues of whether GCU had breached any
duty owed to Mrs. Spafford and whether the Property was in a dangerous and defective
condition that could have caused Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall. (R. 488-507.)
12.

Mr. Smiltneek opined that GCU did not breach any duty owed to Mrs.

Spafford, that the Property is not in a defective or dangerous condition, and that the
pavement, curb, sidewalk of the Property did not cause Mrs. Spafford's alleged injuries.
(R. 428-443, 447-48.)
13.

Mr. Smiltneek in his report, offered his opinion on technical and

specialized matters including the following:
(a)

The sidewalk and curb where Mrs. Spafford is alleged to have fallen

is nearly perfectly level and is in a normal and expected condition;
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(b)

The location of the drain near the east curb of the Property does not

indicate any dangerous or defective condition in the Property;
(c)

The curb at the location of Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall is not

unusually high and is the height of an ordinary step;
(d)

The circumstances of Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall indicate that her

fall was caused by her own physical condition and not by the condition of the
pavement, curb, or sidewalk at the Property, and
(e)

The asphalt pavement, curb and sidewalk features encountered by

Mrs. Spafford as she made her way to Property were not in violation of any
building code requirements, nor were they dangerous or defective.
(R. 428-443, 448.)
3.

Procedural History.

14.

On August 2, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action. (R. 1-6.)

15.

The Spaffords' Complaint asserts a two causes of action The first is a

claim for negligence asserted by Mrs. Spafford and the second is a claim for loss of
consortium asserted by Mr. Spafford. (R 1-6.)
16.

On November 28, 2007, a telephonic scheduling conference was held

between Patricia LaTulippe, Esq., then counsel for Plaintiffs, and counsel for GCU.
(R. 21-26.)
17.

The original Scheduling Order in this matter was prepared by counsel for

Plaintiffs and was signed by both parties in January 2008. (R. 21-26.)
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18.

Pursuant to the original Scheduling Order, Plaintiffs were to serve their

expert witness designations and reports by August 31, 2008. (R. 21-26.)
19.

On July 30, 2008, pursuant to a stipulation and motion of the parties, the

District Court entered an amended scheduling order (the "First Amended Scheduling
Order"), which extended the deadlines for completion of fact and expert discovery.
(R. 50-54.)
20.

The First Amended Scheduling Order extended the date for service of

Plaintiffs' expert witness designations and reports to December 1, 2008. (R. 50-54.)
21.

On October 31, 2008, the parties filed a Joint Motion and Stipulation for

Amendment of Scheduling Order, again seeking to extend only the deadlines for
completion of fact and expert discovery. (R. 58-61.)
22.

On November 3, 2008, the District Court entered an Order Amending

Scheduling Order ("Second Amended Scheduling Order"). (R. 62-64.)
23.

The Second Amended Scheduling Order extended the date for service of

Plaintiffs' expert witness designations and reports to February 2, 2009. (R. 62-64.)
24.

On January 8, 2009, the parties filed a Joint Motion and Stipulation for

Amendment of Scheduling Order, which again sought to modify the cut-off dates for
completion of fact and expert discovery. (R. 68-71.)
25.

On January 14, 2009, the District Court entered an Order Amending

Scheduling Order (the "Third Amended Scheduling Order"). (R. 72-74.)
26.

The Third Amended Scheduling Order extended the date for service of

Plaintiffs' expert witness designations and reports until April 3, 2009. (R. 72-74.)
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27.

On March 13, 2009, the parties filed a Joint Motion and Stipulation for

Amendment of Scheduling Order, which, once again, sought only to modify the cut-off
dates for completion of fact and expert discovery. (R. 174-77.)
28.

On March 18, 2009, the District Court entered an Order Amending

Scheduling Order (the "Fourth Amended Scheduling Order"). (R. 178-80.)
29.

Pursuant to the Fourth Amended Scheduling Order, the parties agreed that

the deadlines in this matter would be as follows:
1.
The cut-off date for completion of fact discovery to be
extended from March 13, 2009 to April 24, 2009;
2.
The deadline for service of Plaintiffs'expert witnesses
and reports to be extended from April 3, 2009 to May 15,
2009;
3.
The deadline for service of Defendant's expert witness
and reports to be extended from May 1, 2009 to June 12,
2009;
4.
Defendant shall identify non-named parties who may
share liability by April 24, 2009; and
5.
The deadline for filing dispositive or potentially
dispositive motions to be extended from June 19, 2009 to
July 31, 2009.
(R. 178-80.)
30.

On November 17, 2008, in responding to GCU's first set of interrogatories,

the Spaffords represented that they had not yet determined which expert witnesses they
would call at trial. (R. 451-52, 504-512.)
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31.

On June 4, 2009, after the deadline for service of Plaintiffs' expert witness

designations and reports, Ms. LaTulippe and the law firm of Nielsen and Senior withdrew
as counsel for the Spaffords. (R. 242-43)
32.

On June 29, 2009, the Spaffords filed pro se appearances in this action.

(R.452)
33.

On August 3, 2009, more than three months after the deadline for service of

Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure and expert reports, the Spaffords served their
Disclosure of Expert Witness ("Expert Disclosure"). (R. 304-32, 453.)
34.

By the Expert Disclosure, the Spaffords purported to designate Clarence

Kemp, P.E., Senior Project Engineer, as an expert expected to testify with respect to the
matters set forth in Mr. Kemp's letter to Ms. LaTulippe of December 3, 2006. (R. 30424.)
35.

The Expert Disclosure attaches a letter dated December 3, 2006 from

Clarence Kemp, P.E., to Ms. LaTulippe, the Spaffords' former counsel, which is labeled
"Attorney Privileged Communication" (the "Kemp Letter"). (R. 304-24.)
36.

The Kemp Letter makes no mention of the location of Mrs. Spafford's

alleged fall or the date of the alleged fall, and offers no opinion on the causation of Mrs.
Spafford's alleged fall. (R. 304-24.)
37.

On August 17, 2009, GCU filed a motion seeking to strike the Spaffords'

Expert Disclosure on the basis that it was not timely served and fails to comply with the
requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). (R. 391-422.)
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38.

On August 19, 2009, GCU filed its motion for summary judgment, which

was accompanied by an Affidavit of Larry Smiltneek, M.S., P.S.E., in which Mr.
Smiltneek testified, consistent with his expert report, that the Property was not in
dangerous or defective condition and that Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall was caused by
something in her own physical condition, and not by the condition of the pavement, curb
and sidewalk at the Property." (R. 428-43, 444-515.)
39.

On October 9, 2009, the Spaffords filed their Motion for Enlargement of

Time, by which they sought entry of an order extending the May 15, 2009 deadline for
the Spaffords to designate their experts, nearly five months after that deadline had
expired. (R. 625-36.) GCU opposed this Motion. (R. 756-71.)
40.

On October 13, 2009, the Spaffords filed their Memorandum in Opposition

to GCU's motion for summary judgment. (R. 654-747.)
41.

As a part of their opposition to GCU's motion for summary judgment, the

Spaffords submitted the Affidavit of Earl S. Spafford (the "Spafford Affidavit") and the
Affidavit of Clarence Kemp, B.C.S.E., P.E., and Senior Project Engineer ("Kemp
Affidavit"). (R. 701-728.)
42.

On October 20, 2009, GCU filed its Motion to Strike Expert Testimony, by

which GCU sought entry of an order striking the Kemp Affidavit and barring Mr. Kemp
from testifying in this matter. (R. 788-819.)
43.

On October 20, 2009 GCU filed its Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Earl S.

Spafford, by which GCU sought entry of an order striking paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
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10, and 11 of the Spafford Affidavit as conclusory, stating legal conclusions, and
containing matters that are an improper subject for lay opinion testimony. (R. 820-51.)
44.

On November 24, 2009 at 2:00 p.m. a hearing was held before the District

Court, the Honorable Tyrone S. Medley. The Spaffords appeared at the hearing pro-se,
and GCU was represented by its counsel. The District Court heard argument on the
following motions:
(a)

Defendant's Motion to Strike Disclosure of Expert Witness, filed

August 17,2009;
(b)

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 19, 2009;

(c)

Defendant's Motion to Strike Expert Testimony, filed October 20,

(d)

Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Earl S. Spafford, filed

2009;

October 20, 2009.
(e)

Defendants' Motion to Strike Untimely Memorandum in Opposition

to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2009; and
(f)

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed August 24, 2009;
(g)

Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time, filed October 5, 2009;

(h)

Plaintiffs' [renewed] Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 2009.
(R. 1343-1348.)
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45.

On November 25, 2009, the District Court held a telephonic hearing (the

"Telephonic Hearing") during which it announced its ruling on the various motions
considered during the November 24 hearing. (R. 1274-1323, 1343-1348.)
46.

The District Court granted the following motions:
(a)

Defendant's Motion to Strike Disclosure of Expert Witness, filed

August 17, 2009;
(b)

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 19, 2009;

(c)

Defendant's Motion to Strike Expert Testimony, filed October 20,

(d)

Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Earl S. Spafford, filed

2009;

October 20, 2009.
(R. 1274-1323, 1343-1348.)
47.

In addition, the District Court denied the following motions:
(a)

Defendants' Motion to Strike Untimely Memorandum in Opposition

to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2009; and
(b)

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed August 24, 2009;
(c)

Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time, filed October 5, 2009;

(d)

Plaintiffs' [renewed] Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 2009.
(R. 1274-1323, 1343-1348.)
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48.

On December 1, 2009, the Spaffords filed a Motion to Recuse or Disqualify

("Motion to Disqualify"), seeking to disqualify the Honorable Tyrone S. Medley from
presiding over the case. The Spaffords' motion was accompanied by an Affidavit of
Prejudice executed on December 1, 2009 by Earl S. Spafford. (R. 1156-1243.)
49.

GCU filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Spaffords' Motion to

Disqualify on December 15, 2009, arguing that the reviewing judge should deny the
Motion to Disqualify because it was based on nothing more than adverse rulings against
the Spaffords and unsupported allegations of bias. (R. 1274-1323.)
50.

On December 21, 2009, Judge Paul G. Maughn, Associate Presiding Judge

of the Third Judicial District Court, entered a Ruling and Order denying the Spaffords'
Motion to Disqualify and determining that there was an "absence of credible evidence of
actual bias arising out of Judge Medley's rulings." (R. 1334-37.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of GCU and the
Associate Presiding Judge's denial of the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify should be
affirmed. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in striking the Spaffords'
untimely Expert Disclosure or in excluding the Kemp Affidavit. The deadline for service
of the Spaffords' expert disclosure was extended by mutual consent of the parties on four
occasions, and finally expired on May 15, 2009, at which point the Spaffords were still
represented by counsel. More than two months after the expiration of this deadline, on
August 3, 2009, the Spaffords served their Expert Disclosure. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f)
requires a court to exclude expert testimony where such testimony is not timely disclosed
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in accordance with the rules. In addition, while the Spaffords claim that by providing the
Kemp Letter to GCU's insurer they negated any prejudice to GCU caused by the
untimely disclosure, in so arguing they ignore their own representation in discovery that
as of November, 2008 they had yet to determined their experts for trial. Notably, this
statement by the Spaffords came more than one year after the Spaffords filed their
complaint and nearly two years after the date of the Kemp Letter (which the Spaffords
subsequently identified as their expert report).
In addition, to the extent the District Court erred in striking the Spaffords'
untimely Expert Disclosure, such error was harmless. The Kemp Affidavit, on which the
Spaffords relied to oppose GCU's motion for summary judgment, asserts opinions that
are beyond those set forth in the Kemp Letter (the Spaffords' expert report). Because of
this, the District Court's striking of the Kemp Affidavit was warranted even if the
Spaffords' untimely Expert Disclosure should have been allowed.
Similarly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Spaffords'
motion for enlargement of time. The Spaffords' motion was filed nearly five months
after the deadline for designation of experts had passed. The Spaffords argued below that
their time to designate experts should be enlarged based on excusable neglect.
Specifically, the Spaffords claimed that, prior to the former counsel's withdrawal, their
former counsel and GCU's counsel had entered into an oral "open-ended" extension of
all deadlines. GCU's counsel denied entering into such a stipulation, and the District
Court held that, based on the history of dealings between the parties, no such stipulation
ever existed. In any case, such a stipulation would be unenforceable under Utah R. Civ.
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P. 29. The District Court further held that, given the record, it could not conclude that
the Spaffords had acted in good faith. Accordingly, the denial of this motion was not an
abuse of discretion.
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in striking portions of the Spafford
Affidavit as conclusory, stating legal conclusions, and containing matters that were
inappropriate for lay witness testimony. District courts have broad discretion in
determining the admissibility of evidence, and neither conclusory statements nor legal
conclusions are admissible. In addition, Mr. Spafford sought to testify on matters
requiring specialized and technical knowledge, including the matters relating to the
construction and design of the Property. Thus, his affidavit was properly stricken.
Having correctly stricken the Spaffords' affidavits offered in opposition to GCU's
motion for summary judgment, the District Court did not err in granting summary
judgment in favor of GCU. Construction and design defects of the type at issue in this
case are of the type requiring specialized and technical knowledge beyond the ordinary
experience of a layperson. Accordingly, the District Court correctly held that the
Spaffords could not meet their burden of proof in this case without presenting expert
testimony on the issues of breach and causation. The Spaffords presented no admissible
expert testimony on these issues. In addition, even if the District Court erred in holding
that expert testimony was required for the Spaffords to meet their burden of proof, such
error would be harmless because, as set forth above, the Spaffords' affidavits offered in
opposition to GCU's motion for summary judgment were properly stricken.
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The Spaffords' argument that GCU had adopted an "advocacy position" for the
District Court in opposing their Motion to Disqualify is unfounded and improper. There
is nothing in the record suggesting that GCU took on any such role. In addition, there is
no Utah authority supporting the Spaffords' argument that a motion to disqualify must be
handled on a strictly pro-se basis. Finally, the Spaffords' argument, which represents an
attack on the integrity of GCU's counsel and the District Court, violates Utah R. App. P.
24(k).
Finally, the Associate Presiding Judge correctly denied the Spaffords' Motion to
Disqualify, which was based on nothing more than adverse rulings and wholly devoid of
any evidence of bias.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
STRIKING THE SPAFFORDS' UNTIMELY EXPERT DISCLOSURE OR
THE KEMP AFFIDAVIT.
"'A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its

determination typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.'"
V.K.W.v. State of Utah. 2003 UT App. 87, If 9, 67 P.3d 1037, 1038-39 (quoting State v.
Comer, 2002 UT App 219, PI 1, 51 P.3d 55). District courts also have broad discretion to
determine the admissibility of expert testimony. Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1326
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). District court rulings on issues relating to the admission of expert
testimony are reversed only when they "exceed the limit[] of reasonability." State v.
Hollen. 2002 UT 35, Tj 66, 44 P.3d 794; Walker v. Hansen. 2003 UT App. 237, ^ 20, 74
P.3d 635, 639. This Court should affirm the District Court's rulings because striking the

DMEAST#12984034 v3

18

Spaffords' untimely Expert Disclosure and the Kemp Affidavit was not an abuse of
discretion. In addition, even if the striking of the Expert Disclosure was error, it was
harmless error, because the opinions offered in the Kemp Affidavit respecting the issues
of duty, breach, and causation are beyond the scope of the Expert Disclosure and
therefore have been excluded in any event.
A.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Striking the
Untimely Expert Disclosure and the Kemp Affidavit.

The Spaffords served their Expert Disclosure on August 3, 2009, more than two
months after the agreed-upon and court-ordered deadline of May 15, 2009. (R. 393-94.)
The May 15 deadline was the result of the parties extending the date by which the
Spaffords were to disclose their experts on no fewer than four occasions. (R. 392-93.)
Despite this, the Spaffords failed to timely serve their Expert Disclosure. The Spaffords'
Expert Disclosure and the Kemp Affidavit were therefore properly stricken. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 37(f) ("If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as
required by Rule 26(a) ..., that party shall not be permitted to use the witness....");
Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 331, If 8, 170 P.3d 1138 (Rule 37 permits trial court
to exclude the evidence or impose other sanctions when a party fails to provide rule 26(a)
disclosures); Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303,ffif11,18, 141 P.3d 629 ("[T]he
trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by striking [the plaintiffs expert] affidavit"
when the plaintiff neither designated the witness as an expert nor filed an expert report).
The fact that the Spaffords are pro se parties does not excuse their failure to
comply with the scheduling order agreed upon between the parties and entered by the
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District Court. See Cafferty v. Taylor, 2006 UT App. 487, If 2, 2006 WL 3518529
(observing that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with rules). Indeed, Mr.
Spafford himself practiced law in Utah for more than forty years before resigning his
membership in the Utah bar in 1999. (R. 395.) See Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11,ffi[45, 67 P.3d 1000, 1002 (pro se party who is "hardly a stranger to the legal system" is not
entitled to "special leniency on the basis of pro se status"). In any event, at the time the
relevant deadline passed, the Spaffords were represented by counsel. (R. 242-43.)
That the Spaffords provided a copy of the Kemp Letter to GCU's insurer prior to
litigation does not stand in the place of a timely expert disclosure under Utah R. Civ. P.
26(a). The Spaffords did not serve the Kemp Letter on GCU, and the Kemp Letter did
not include "the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored
by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study
and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years." Utah R. Civ. P.
26(a)(3)(B). As such, the Kemp Letter cannot, in and of itself, be considered an adequate
expert disclosure.
In addition, the Spaffords, in responding to discovery in this matter, specifically
advised GCU that as of November 17, 2008, they had not yet selected any trial experts.
(R. 452, 506.) This directly undermines any claim that the Kemp Letter, dated nearly two
years prior to this sworn discovery response, should have been regarded by GCU as an
expert disclosure. GCU is not obligated under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
forecast or anticipate which experts Plaintiffs intend to call at trial. Rather, it was the
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Spaffords' obligation to timely and fully disclose their experts in accordance with the
rules. The Spaffords failed to do so. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure and the
expert testimony of Mr. Kemp were properly stricken.
The Spaffords argue that GCU failed to address "the mechanics of Rule 37" in its
moving papers on its motion to strike the untimely Expert Disclosure. (Appellants' Brief,
46.) This is simply untrue. GCU explicitly cited to Rule 37 in its moving papers. (R.
394-95, 793-94.) Rule 37(f) specifically provides for mandatory exclusion of
undisclosed evidence:
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior
response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall
not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure to disclose.
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (emphasis added). This Court has specifically observed that "Utah
law mandates that a trial court exclude an expert witness report disclosed after expiration
of the established deadline unless the trial court otherwise chooses to exercise its
equitable discretion." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ^ 8,
222 P.3d 775 (emphasis added); see also Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52,
T] 35, 215 P.3d 933, 943 ("When a party fails to make timely disclosure, the district court
is required to impose discovery sanctions on that party unless the 'failure to disclose is
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose.'") (quoting Rule
37(f)).
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Accordingly, the Spaffords' argument that the District Court imposed an unduly
harsh sanction for their admitted violation of their discovery obligations is of no moment.
Neither Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d
876 (Utah 1975), nor Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997),
which the Spaffords characterize as "controlling, but somewhat competing," supports the
proposition that the exclusion of expert testimony in this case was improper.
(Appellants' Brief, 46-47.) Westinghouse does not address the issue of exclusion of an
expert witness, but rather involves whether a trial court abused its discretion in granting a
motion to dismiss as a discovery sanction. Westinghouse, 544 P.2d at 877-79. Similarly,
Morton affirmed the dismissal of a case as a discovery sanction under Rule 37(b) for
failure to comply with an order compelling discovery. Morton, 938 P.2d at 275.
The exclusion of an expert report under Rule 37(f) has been upheld under
circumstances less egregious than this case. See Lippman v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Brokerage Co., 2010 UT App. 89,ffl|2-4 (upholding exclusion of expert
witness testimony where plaintiff sought an extension two days after deadline passed);
Bodell, 2009 UT 52, ^ 35-38 (upholding exclusion of expert testimony on damages
where bases for damage calculation was not disclosed until three weeks after close of fact
discovery). In short, the District Court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 37(f). See
id.»If 37 ("Though the district court could have reopened fact discovery to allow for these
theories, the court was not obligated to do so"); see also Morton, 938 P.2d at 275
("[T]here are two parties to this action, and both are entitled to fair treatment.
[Defendant] did not seek this litigation. Its investment of time and resources toward the
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resolution of this case was not voluntary."). As in Lippman, the District Court
''determined that the failure to disclose was not harmless, i.e., the extension would
prejudice Defendants and delay trial, and did not rule that good cause was shown." 2010
UT App. 89,fflf3-5. Accordingly, the District Court properly excluded the expert
testimony in this case, and the District Court's Order granting summary judgment in
favor of GCU should be upheld. See id. (u[T]he trial court was required to exclude
[expert testimony] by operation of rule 37.")
B.

Even if the District Court Erred in Striking the Spaffords' Untimely
Expert Disclosure, Such Error Was Harmless.

Even if the District Court's order striking the untimely Expert Disclosure was
error, it was harmless. A harmless error is an error that "is sufficiently inconsequential
that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings."
State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^ 20; 20 P.3d 888, 892. In this case, even if the District
Court had permitted the Spaffords' untimely Expert Disclosure, the Kemp Affidavit was
properly stricken to the extent that the opinions and conclusions Mr. Kemp states in his
affidavit are beyond the scope of those set forth in the Kemp Letter, which the Spaffords
urge qualifies as an expert disclosure.
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) states, in relevant part:
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is
retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in
the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly
involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written
report prepared and signed by the witness or party. The
report shall contain the subject matter on which the
expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and
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opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a
summary of the grounds for each opinion; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten
years; the compensation to be paid for the study and
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition
within the preceding four years.
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3(B) (emphasis added). The plain language of this rule requires the
"subject matter" of an expert's testimony and the "substance of the facts and opinions" of
his testimony to be timely and completely disclosed. Id.
In this case, the Kemp Letter, which contains all of the substantive opinions
disclosed in Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure, does not offer any testimony as to the causation
of Mrs. Spafford's alleged injury. Indeed, the Kemp Letter is merely a safety review of
the GCU Midvale branch.1 It makes no mention of the location of Mrs. Spafford's
alleged fall, nor does it state any opinion as to the whether the condition of any portion of
the Property caused Mrs. Spafford's alleged injuries. It also contains material that is
wholly irrelevant to these proceedings, including an analysis of the slope of the
wheelchair ramps on the Property under the Americans With Disabilities Act. Mrs.
Spafford is not confined to a wheelchair and does not claim to have fallen on a ramp at
the Property. Moreover, the Property was constructed well before ADA standards were
adopted. The Spaffords make no allegation in their Complaint that Mrs. Spafford's

The Kemp Affidavit indicates that Mr. Kemp was retained "to determine if the
premises involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature." (R. 702.)
2

See, e.g., Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc.. 452 F.3d 1269. 127273 (11th Cir. 2006) ("The ADA imposes different requirements on the owners and
(continued...)
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alleged injuries were caused by any ADA violation. (R. 1-5.) Critically, the fact that
Mrs. Spafford is alleged to have fallen somewhere on the premises is not even mentioned
in the Kemp Letter. (R. 306-07.) As such, even if Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure is
allowed, Mr. Kemp was not disclosed as an expert on the issues of breach of duty or
causation of injuries.
While Utah courts have not yet addressed this issue, federal courts interpreting
identical requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have made it clear that
an affidavit of an expert that exceeds the scope of the opinions disclosed in that expert's
Rule 26(a)(3) report is inadmissible and should be stricken. "A subsequent expert
affidavit submitted to rebut a summary judgment motion may be excluded if it differs
from an earlier Rule 26 report." Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 596, 603 (S.D. Tex
2001); see also Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354 (1st Cir. 2004) (portions of expert
declaration that went beyond scope of original expert designation should be stricken).
In this case, at minimum, paragraphs 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 17 of the Kemp
Affidavit state conclusions and opinions beyond the scope of the Spaffords' untimely
Expert Disclosure. (R. 306-07, 701-05.) Accordingly, even if the District Court's order
striking the Expert Disclosure were reversed, the order striking the Kemp Affidavit
would still have been correctly entered because the testimony relating to the issue of

(,.. continued)

operators of facilities that existed prior to its enactment date," and requires only that
facilities in existence prior to the ADA "'remove architectural barriers . . . where such
removal is readily achievable'" or make their services available to disabled persons
through other readily achievable means.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v)).
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causation in the Kemp Affidavit is beyond the scope of the Kemp Letter. Thus, even if
the District Court erred in striking the Expert Disclosure, its error was harmless.
IL

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE SPAFFORDS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
TO DESIGNATE EXPERTS.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Spaffords' Motion

for Enlargement of Time. The Spaffords' motion, which sought an order extending the
time in which to serve expert disclosures, was filed more than five months after the courtordered deadline for expert disclosures. (R. 625-33, 756-71.) Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b) states,
in relevant part:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at
or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at
any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice
order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after
the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be
done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect.
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b). When deciding a motion premised on excusable neglect under Rule
6(b), courts consider "(1) whether plaintiff acted in good faith; (2) the danger of prejudice
to the non-moving party; (3) the reason for plaintiffs delay; and (4) the length of the
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings." Stoddard v. Smith, 2001 UT 47,
1f 24, 27 P.3d 546, 551 (affirming district court's denial of Rule 6(b) motion).
The Spaffords argue that their failure to timely disclose their expert witness is
justified by excusable neglect, claiming that their prior counsel was acting under an
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"open ended stipulation" that was agreed upon by counsel for GCU. (Appellants' Brief,
37-39.) As the District Court recognized, this is contradicted by the record and the
history of this case, which included four agreed-upon stipulations extending the deadline
for expert disclosures. (R. 1373-74 (transcript of telephonic hearing).) Counsel for GCU
never agreed to extend any of the deadlines set forth in the Fourth Amended Scheduling
Order, and certainly never agreed to an "open ended extension." (R. 756-71.) Nor did
GCU's counsel, as the Spaffords suggest, "harshly den[y] and decline[] to follow" any
such agreed-upon "open ended extension." (Appellants' Brief, 37.) The fact is that no
such agreed-upon stipulation ever existed. (R. 756-71.)
In any event, even if the Spaffords' self-serving claim of an orally agreed-upon
"open ended extension" were true, such agreement would be entirely unenforceable.
Utah R. Civ. P. 29 could not be more clear on this on this point:
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written
stipulation . . . (2) modify the procedures provided by these
rules for disclosure and discovery . . . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 29 (emphasis added.) The plain language of this rule requires that any
modification of an expert disclosure deadline be made by written stipulation. Thus, even
if the parties had discussed an oral stipulation, which they did not, a written stipulation
would have been required.
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Federal case law interpreting the language of Rule 29 makes it clear that absent a
written stipulation, there can be no modifications to disclosure deadlines. See, e.g.,
Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, GMBH, 46 F.3d 1298, 1311 (3d. Cir. 1995) ("We
observe, as did the district court, that plaintiff has failed to comport with Rule 29 of the
[Fed. R. Civ. P.] which requires a written stipulation when modifying procedures
governing discovery."); Lee v. Central Gulf Towing, L.L.C., No. 04-1497, 2004 WL
2988478, *2, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257 (E.D. La. December 9, 2004) (unpublished)
("The purpose of requiring written stipulations is to eliminate the possibility of confusion
and disagreement between counsel as to what was agreed upon.").4
As the District Court recognized, the Spaffords' effort to support their claim of
excusable neglect by arguing that they acted in good faith is belied by the fact that there
was no written stipulation reflecting the "open ended" extension they and their former
counsel claim existed, and they have never presented a single piece of documentary
evidence indicating the existence of such a stipulation. (R. 1375 (page 67 of transcript of
November 25 Hearing).) The District Court, in fact, noted that based on the record, it
could not conclude that the Spaffords had acted in good faith in filing their motion for
enlargement of time. (Id) It is also telling that the Spaffords filed a motion seeking to
vacate all scheduling order deadlines in this case on July 20, 2009, without making any
While Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 was amended in 2007 to eliminate the requirement of
a written stipulation, Utah opted to retain this requirement and has not adopted this
change to the Federal Rules. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 with Utah R. Civ. P. 29.
In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 30(f), a true and correct copy of this
opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
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mention of a purported stipulation or claiming excusable neglect. (R. 248-50.) Indeed,
making no claim of an orally agreed-upon stipulation, the Spaffords argued that as pro-se
parties, they were entirely immune from scheduling orders under Rule 26(a). (R. 519-24,
1377.)
GCU, for its part, denies having entered into any oral stipulation, and the District
Court determined below that no such stipulation existed. (R. 1378 (pages 66-69 of
transcript of November 25, 2009 telephonic hearing.) It is precisely this type of situation
that Utah R. Civ. P. 29 was intended to remedy. Utah R. Civ. P. 29 renders the
Spaffords' claimed "oral stipulation" a nullity because even if it existed, it would be
unenforceable.
In any event, the lack of due diligence on the part of the Spaffords and their
counsel establishes that there was no excusable neglect in this case. See Mini Spas, Inc.
v.Indus. Common of Utah, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (defining "excusable neglect"
as requiring the exercise of due diligence by a "reasonably prudent person under similar
circumstances," and considering a mistake inexcusable where party failed to exercise due
diligence).
In addition, the District Court correctly determined that GCU would suffer
prejudice if it granted the Spaffords' request for enlargement of time. "The purpose of
requiring parties to disclose witnesses by a certain date is to allow the lawsuit to proceed
in an orderly way and to avoid unnecessary trial delays." Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah,
2010 UT App 171, If 15, 235 P.3d 791. Permitting the Spaffords' after-the-fact
disclosure of their expert witness would effectively nullify the scheduling orders agreed
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upon by the parties and entered by the District Court and it would be contrary to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. As the District Court recognized, GCU would be unfairly
prejudiced by the time, burden, and expense of additional discovery, including the
potential deposition of Mr. Kemp and other expert discovery.5 (R. 1372 (page 68 of
hearing transcript).) In addition, GCU, at the time of the Spaffords' motion to enlarge
time, had filed a motion for summary judgment based on the lack of a timely disclosure
of expert testimony. (Id) GCU timely completed all of its discovery in this matter and
timely made all required disclosures.
The Spaffords' argument that GCU would not suffer prejudice because the case
was "nowhere near trial" when they filed their motion to enlarge time is entirely
misplaced. (Appellants' Brief, 42.) As the Spaffords' admit, fact discovery in this case
had been closed for over 90 days at the time their motion was filed. (Id.) While no trial
date had yet been set, with fact discovery complete, and all experts having been
designated, the case was far closer to trial than the Spaffords' represent, assuming the
case had not been disposed of on summary judgment.
In addition, the Spaffords' claim that any prejudice to GCU is ameliorated by their
having provided a copy of the Kemp Letter to GCU's insurer before litigation
Contrary to the Spaffords' representation in their brief, GCU did not "ma[ke]
the deliberate decision to forego" taking the deposition of Mr. Kemp. (Appellants' Brief,
41.) GCU had no need to undertake the expense of deposing Mr. Kemp, given that he
was never properly disclosed as an expert. GCU had no duty to build the Spaffords' case
for them by deposing an undesignated expert or to make the assumption that Mr. Kemp
would be their designated expert. Simply put, a party cannot be deemed to have
"foregone" the opportunity to depose an expert where no expert has been designated.
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commenced is incorrect. (Appellants' Brief, 40-41.) In making this argument, the
Spaffords necessarily ignore the fact that in responding to discovery in this matter, they
specifically advised GCU that, as of November 17, 2008, they had not yet determined
which experts they would use at trial. GCU had no way of knowing that Plaintiffs,
having made this representation, intended to use Mr. Kemp as a testifying expert. GCU
is not obligated under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to forecast or anticipate which
experts the Spaffords intend to call at trial. Rather, it was the Spaffords' obligation to
timely and fully disclose their experts in accordance with the rules.
Finally, the Spaffords' pro-se status does not justify their failure to comply with
court-ordered disclosure deadlines or support their claim of excusable neglect. See
Cafferty, 2006 UT App. 487, ^J 2 (pro se litigants must comply with rules.) There is no
justification for the Spaffords' failure to timely disclose experts, and no excusable neglect
that could justify the after-the-fact extension embodied in their motion to enlarge time.
Accordingly, the District Court's denial of that motion was not an abuse of discretion.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
STRIKING PORTIONS OF THE SPAFFORD AFFIDAVIT AS
CONCLUSORY, STATING LEGAL CONCLUSIONS, AND CONTAINING
IMPROPER LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting GCU's motion to strike

the Spafford Affidavit. District Courts have "broad discretion to admit or exclude
evidence" and their rulings on evidentiary matters are rarely disturbed. V.K.W. v. State
of Utah, 2003 UT App. 87, If 9, 67 P.3d 1037, 1038-39. The District Court struck
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Spafford Affidavit as conclusory, stating

legal conclusions, and containing matters that are not properly the subject of lay opinion
testimony. (R.70-71.)
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) states that affidavits supporting or opposing a summary
judgment motion "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). It is axiomatic
that a court must disregard any portion of an affidavit that is conclusory or contains
"legal conclusion^] that the [affiant is] not qualified to make." Capital Assets Financial
Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Norton v. Blackham, 669
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (conclusory affidavits are inadmissible); see also Harris v.
Beneficial Oklahoma, Inc., 209 B.R. 990, 997 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) ("[A]n affidavit
containing conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts lacks probative
value.").
Paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11 of the Spafford Affidavit are either conclusory
or state legal conclusions. As such, the District Court properly struck these paragraphs.
For example, in paragraphs 3, 8, and 11 of the Spafford Affidavit, Mr. Spafford, a former
attorney, attempts to state legal conclusions as the proper scope of lay witness testimony.
(R. 707-11.) In addition, Mr. Spafford makes an unsupported legal conclusion in
paragraph 10 as to the adequacy of GCU's accessible parking areas. (R. 710.) Further,
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Spafford Affidavit characterize the Property as "badly
maintained," "inadequately painted," and "in a state of disrepair," without reference to
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any factual basis to support these conclusions. (R. 709.) Each of these paragraphs is
conclusory and therefore was properly stricken.
In addition, Utah R. Evid. 701 states that lay "witness' testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or the determination of the fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 701. Lay
witness testimony that purports to offer testimony on matters based on "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge" is improper and inadmissible. State v.
Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App. 226, Tf 11, 95 P.3d 1193, 1196. In paragraphs 3-11 of the
Spafford Affidavit, Mr. Spafford attempted to offer his opinion as a lay witness with
respect to numerous issues relating to the construction, design, and maintenance of the
GCU's property. (R. 707-11.) These are each matters requiring specialized knowledge
beyond the scope of lay testimony. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in striking the Spafford Affidavit.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF GCU.
A.

The District Court Did Not Err in Granting GCU's Motion for
Summary Judgment Because There Were No Disputes of Material Fact
and GCU Was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law.

The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of GCU.
Summary judgment is appropriate '"against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish an existence of an element essential to that parties case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial/" Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d

1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317
(1986)). The "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts and material." Id.
1.

The Spaffords Bore the Burden of Establishing the Elements of
Their Claims and Failed to Meet that Burden.

The Spaffords asserted two causes of action against GCU in their complaint: (1) a
negligence claim and (2) a claim for loss of consortium. (R. 1-6.) Under Utah law, a
"spouse's action for loss of consortium ... [is] derivative from the cause of action existing
in behalf of the injured person[?] and ... [it] may not exist in cases where the injured
person would not have a cause of action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(5)(a), (b).
Accordingly, because Mrs. Spafford's negligence claim fails as a matter of law, Mr.
Spafford's claim for loss of consortium also fails. See Fox v. Brigham Young
University,, 2007 UT App. 406,1f 24, 176 P.3d 446, 451 (upholding dismissal of loss of
consortium claim on basis that it "ceased to exist" when plaintiffs' negligence claim
failed).
"The essential elements of a negligence action are: (1) a duty of reasonable care
owed by the defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation, both
actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff."
Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). The Spaffords allege that GCU
breached its duty to maintain safe premises and to eliminate dangerous conditions and
defects on the Property, and that such alleged breach caused Mrs. Spafford's alleged
injuries. (Complaint, ffif 16-19.) The Spaffords' negligence claim fails as a matter of law
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because the Spaffords cannot meet their burden of establishing that GCU breached a duty
owed to Mrs. Spafford. "Plaintiffs carry the 'burden [of] establishing] a prima facie case
of negligence,' .. . including "proximate and actual causation of the injury." Fox, 2007
UT App. 406,1f 21, 176 P.3d at 451 (quoting Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598,
601 (Utah Ct.App. 1995)).
In this case, the District Court correctly held that Plaintiffs bore the burden of
establishing the elements of duty and causation through expert testimony. (R. 1372 (page
70 of hearing transcript).) Proving a breach of a duty of care involving a construction or
design defect requires expert testimony. "Where the average person has little
understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions, expert testimony
must ordinarily be presented to establish the standard of care." Wycalis v. Guardian Title
of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). For this reason, expert testimony
is required to establish the standard of care for engineers and architects. Preston &
Chambers, P.C. v. Koller. 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Nauman v. Harold K.
Beecher & Assocs., 467 P.2d 610, 615 (Utah 1970); Nat'l Housing Indus., Inc. v. E. L.
Jones Dev. Co., 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); see also Ford Motor Co. v.
Bartholomew, 297 S.E.2d 675, 679 (Va. 1982) (expert testimony required to demonstrate
defect in automotive transmission design).
In Fox, on nearly identical facts, the plaintiffs sought to recover for a fall Mrs. Fox
suffered on a stairway on the Brigham Young University ("BYU") campus. 2007 UT
App 406, *|J1I 2-3. The Foxes brought claims for negligence and loss of consortium,
asserting that BYU had negligently maintained the stairs and that the defective stairs had
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caused Mrs. Fox's fall and injuries. IcLTJ8. BYU filed a motion in limine arguing that H
the Foxes' negligence claim failed because the Foxes did not have expert testimony to
establish a prima facie case of negligence. Id. The trial court converted BYU's motion
to a motion to dismiss. Id. Y[[ 9-10. In dismissing the Foxes' claims with prejudice, the
trial court noted that "it had been presented with two plausible theories of causation—
failure of an osteoarthritic knee or defective stairs—and, absent expert testimony, the
court would have to use speculation to choose between the two theories." Id.fflf9-11.
This Court affirmed, holding that expert testimony was necessary to prove the casual link
between BYU's alleged negligence and Mrs. Fox's claimed injury. Id. <([ 23.
The Spaffords argue that Fox stands only for the narrow proposition that expert
testimony is only required in cases involving "obscure medical factors." (Appellants'
Brief, 24.) This overly narrow reading of Fox, however, is contrary to Fox and wellestablished Utah law. Fox does not stand for the mere proposition that expert testimony
is required only in cases involving "obscure medical factors." Rather, Fox recognizes
that, under Utah law, expert testimony is required in cases where the elements of a
negligence claim must be proven through resort to factors beyond the knowledge of the
ordinary lay person. See Fox, 2007 UT App 406, ^ 22 (element of negligence requiring
reference to "factors which are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge" must be
proven through expert testimony). The factual similarity between Fox and this case
cannot be ignored. Fox, like this case, involved a fall claimed to have been caused by
defects in construction, design, and maintenance. Id Moreover, Utah law is clear that
expert testimony is required in any case involving matters that are beyond the knowledge
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of ordinary lay people. See Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825 n. 8 (expert testimony required in
cases "[w]here the average person has little understanding of the duties owed").
In this case, the District Court correctly determined that the Spaffords could not
meet their burden of establishing through expert testimony a breach of duty by GCU or
that any alleged negligence of GCU caused Mrs. Spafford's alleged injuries. (R. 71.)
Questions regarding whether the construction, design, and maintenance of the Property
were dangerous and defective clearly involve matters that are beyond the experience of
an ordinary lay juror. For example, the Spaffords rely on allegations that Mrs. Spafford's
alleged injury was caused by structural defects in the curb of the Property and that the
Property was in violation of various building codes. (R. 657-670.) GCU presented
expert testimony in support of its motion, establishing that the curb claimed to be the
cause of Mrs. Spafford's fall was neither dangerous nor defective, and that Mrs.
Spafford's alleged injuries were caused by her own physical condition, not by the
condition of the Property. (R. 428-23.) The Spaffords failed to counter this evidence
through admissible expert testimony. As set forth above, the testimony of the Spaffords'
designated expert was properly excluded. Accordingly, the District Court correctly
entered summary judgment in favor of GCU.
The Spaffords incorrectly argue that GCU's expert testimony, the ADA, and the
deposition testimony of GCU's former CEO "that he personally conducted periodic
inspections of the property" somehow satisfies their burden of establishing a breach of
duty by GCU. (Appellants' Brief, 15-18) The Spaffords have never raised any claim that
Mrs. Spafford was injured as a result of an ADA violation, or even any claim that

Mrs. Spafford has a disability. (R. 1-5.) Given that, it is perplexing that the Spaffords
are now arguing on appeal that GCU breached a duty to remove "architectural barriers"
to the Property and that Mrs. Spafford was injured as a consequence.6 This issue was
never raised prior to this appeal and cannot be raised now. See Jacobsen v. Thomas,
2008 UT App. 334, % 3 (appellate court "will not review issues not preserved below"). In
addition, this argument consists of rank speculation. The Spaffords bore the burden of
establishing a breach of a duty owed to them through expert testimony and failed to do
so.7 Accordingly, the District Court correctly entered summary judgment in GCU's
favor.
2.

If the District Court Erred in Requiring Expert Testimony to
Establish the Elements of Breach and Causation, Such Error Was
Harmless.

Even if the District Court erred in its application of Fox and holding that the
Spaffords were required to present expert testimony to support their claims, such error is
harmless and does not warrant reversal. A party opposing summary judgment '"must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Peterson v. Coca-Cola

"Architectural barriers are physical features that limit or prevent people with
disabilities from obtaining the goods or services that are offered" by a business. United
States Small Business Administration, United States Department of Justice, ADA Guide
for Small Businesses, October 9, 2008, http://www.ada.gov/smbustxt.htm; 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The Spaffords, however, have never alleged that Mrs. Spafford,
prior to her fall, was a person with a disability—indeed, they argued the contrary.
(R. 710.)
Contrary to the Spaffords' argument, GCU did object to pictures appended to
the Spafford Affidavit, and in fact obtained an order striking the paragraph in which those
pictures were identified. (Appellants5 Brief, 16, R. 708, 820-51, 1343-48.)
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USA, 2002 UT 42, ^ 20, 48 P.3d 941 (quoting Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936
(Utah 1979)). Inadmissible affidavits cannot be used to oppose a motion for summary
judgment. Pipkin v. Haugen, 2003 UT App. 216, ^ 2-3. In this case, the Spaffords
attempted to oppose GCU's motion through the affidavits of Earl S. Spafford and
Clarence Kemp. As set forth above, the District Court properly excluded Mr. Kemp's
expert testimony and every paragraph of Mr. Spafford's affidavit related in any way to
the Spaffords' claims. Accordingly, even if the District Court had not required the
Spaffords to present expert testimony in support of their claims, the only evidence before
the District Court on GCU's motion was the Smiltneek Affidavit, which plainly satisfied
GCU's burden of establishing that there was no genuine issue of material fact precluding
the entry of summary judgment. Thus, while GCU contends that the District Court
properly applied Fox and correctly held that the Spaffords were required to present expert
testimony in support of their claims, any error of the District Court on these issues was
harmless and does not warrant reversal.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID
NOT VIOLATE THE SPAFFORDS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
The Spaffords argue that the District Court's rulings on the evidentiary issues and

GCU's motion for summary judgment in this case deprived them of their constitutional
rights under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, the Due Process
Clause of the Utah State Constitution, and the Open Courts Clause of the Utah State
Constitution. (Appellants' Brief, 54-56.) These arguments are incorrect.

-
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As an initial matter, while the Utah Open Courts Clause "provides citizens of Utah
the right to a remedy for an injury," that right certainly does not alter a plaintiffs
o

obligation to meet the burden of proof set forth by law with respect to their claims.
Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2005 UT 30, ^ 13, 116 P.3d 295, 299; Utah R. Civ.
P. 56; see also Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1891 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (summary
judgment is appropriate against party who fails to meet burden of proof). Indeed, the
Open Courts Clause is intended as a limit on "the legislature's power to abrogate existing
legal rights." Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, If 42, 57 P.3d 1007, 1019. In this
case, the Spaffords were not deprived of the opportunity to present their claims to a court
of this state. To the contrary, they were allowed open and fair access to an impartial
forum, but failed to sustain their burden.
Similarly, the Spaffords have not been deprived of their constitutional rights to
due process under the U.S. and Utah constitutions. Due process entails the right to notice
and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002
UT 6, f 38, 44 P.3d 663. The Spaffords were given this opportunity. All matters ruled
upon by the District Court were fully briefed by both parties, and the Spaffords were
permitted a full and fair opportunity to argue their positions before the District Court.
The mere fact that the Spaffords' "day in court" did not turn out favorably does not
establish the existence of a due process violation.
The Utah Open Courts Clause provides in relevant part that "all courts shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 11 (2010).
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VI.

THE SPAFFORDS' ARGUMENT THAT GCU "ADOPTED AN
ADVOCACY ROLE ON BEHALF OF THE COURT" IN OPPOSING THE
SPAFFORDS' MOTION TO RECUSE OR DISQAULIFY IS UNFOUNDED.
The Spaffords argue that GCU improperly "stepped into the shoes of the [District

Court] in an advocacy role" by filing "extensive memoranda in opposition" to the
Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice by which they sought disqualification of Judge Medley.
(Appellants' Brief, 26.) This argument is unfounded, legally incorrect, and improper
under Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
A.

The Spaffords' Claim that GCU Assumed an Advocacy Role for the
District Court Lacks Any Evidential Basis.

The Spaffords' argument that GCU adopted an advocacy role for the District
Court and "enter[ed] almost a general appearance for the court" simply by opposing the
Motion to Disqualify is unfounded and lacks support in the record. GCU has not acted or
attempted to act as an advocate for the District Court, and to suggest otherwise
mischaracterizes GCU's memoranda and the process for resolving disqualification
motions, in which GCU was entitled to participate.
B.

GCU Had the Right to Oppose the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify,

The Spaffords argue that motions to disqualify are required by rule to be handled
on a strictly ex parte basis. (Appellants' Brief, 27.) The Spaffords have not, however,
cited any authority supporting their novel contention. Indeed, the plain language of Rule
63(b) does not state or require that motions to disqualify be handled on an ex parte basis.
Nothing in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states or implies that an opposing party is
not entitled to oppose a disqualification motion.

4i

To the contrary, Rule 63 states that that disqualification can be sought by motion.
Rule 7(c)(1), which governs motions filed in Utah courts, states that:
[M]otions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be
accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days
after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a
party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in
opposition.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). The Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was filed and designated by
the Spaffords as a motion. Under the plain language of Rule 7(c)(1), GCU is permitted
ten days in which to oppose such a motion. See In the Interest of A.M., 2009 UT App.
118, If 19, 208 P.3d 1058 ("Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the
nonmoving party to file a memorandum in opposition within ten days of service of the
original motion and memorandum.")
The Spaffords rely on the following language of Rule 63(b)(2) in a vain attempt to
support their position that a motion to disqualify must be handled on an ex parte basis:
The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed
shall, without further hearing, enter an order granting the
motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing
judge. The judge shall take no further action in the case until
the motion is decided.
Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(2). Nothing in this language, however, prohibits an opposing party
from exercising its rights under Rule 7(c)(1) when a motion to disqualify has been filed.
Instead, the language of this rule is directed solely to "[t]he judge against whom the
motion and affidavit are directed." Rule 63(b)(2). GCU is a party, not a judge to whom a
motion to disqualify has been directed.
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In addition, the Associate Presiding Judge's ruling on the Spaffords' Motion to
Disqualify was issued a mere five days after GCU filed its memorandum in opposition to
the Spaffords'motion. (R. 1274-1323, 1334-37.) That ruling makes no reference to
GCU's memorandum. (R. 1334-37.) Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record that
GCU's filing of an opposition memorandum in any way affected the outcome of the
Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify. Indeed, the record suggests the contrary, as the ruling
concluded as a matter of law that the Spaffords had presented no evidence of actual bias
on the part of Judge Medley. (R. 1334-37.) Accordingly, even if GCU's filing of an
opposition memorandum could somehow be characterized as an appealable error in the
proceedings below, such error was harmless and cannot justify reversal.
C.

The Spaffords' Claim that GCU Improperly Entered a General
Appearance for the District Court Violates Utah R. App. P. 24(k).

Utah R. App. P. 24(k) requires that briefs submitted to this Court be "free from
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." In their brief, the Spaffords
accuse GCU of making filings for the purpose of "abus[ing] process" in a "transparent
effort to curry favor with the trial court." (Appellants' Brief, 30.) The Spaffords further
characterize GCU's efforts to oppose their Motion to Disqualify as "almost akin to
Granite entering a general appearance for the trial court." (Id.) The Spaffords further
accuse GCU of attempting to "interject prejudice or to otherwise curry unwarranted favor
with the trial court." (R. 33.) These accusations are based on self-serving
characterizations and speculation, and are entirely contradicted by the record, which

shows that GCU has done nothing other than diligently protect its rights in accordance
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1264-1323.)
Equally troubling is the Spaffords' suggestion that GCU and the District Court
improperly conspired to violate the Spaffords' rights. (Appellants' Brief, 33-35.) Indeed,
the Spaffords' Brief strongly suggest both that GCU attempted to curry favor by taking
on such role and that such efforts would be successful, thereby depriving the Spaffords of
their due process rights. (Appellants' Brief, 33-35.) The Spaffords even go so far as to
accuse the District Court or GCU of attempting, through unknown persons, to alter the
docket in order to prevent their exercise of appellate rights. (Appellants' Brief, 32-33.)
These unfounded accusations amount to an attack on the integrity of GCU and the
District Court, in direct contravention of Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
VIL

THE ASSOCIATE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE SPAFFORDS' MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE TYRONE S. MEDLEY.
The Associate Presiding Judge did not err in denying the Spaffords' Motion to

Disqualify. u[T]he question of whether a party's affidavit alleging judicial bias is legally
sufficient is a question of law." In re MJU 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Rule 63(b) states that a motion to disqualify "shall be supported by an affidavit stating
facts sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest." Utah R. Civ. P.
63(b)(1)(A). "[A]n affiant alleging bias on the part of a judge bears the burden of
demonstrating that the judge is not qualified to act on the case." In re Affidavit of Bias,
947 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 1997). u[S]uch bias may not be based solely on the fact that
the judge has issued prior rulings adverse to the party making the allegation." In re M.L.,
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965 P.2d at 556. "[T]he mere fact that a judge decides a case against a party may not be
considered in determining bias." In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d at 1154. Judges are
presumed to be qualified and, in order to warrant recusal of a judge, judicial bias alleged
in an affidavit must have some basis in fact and not be grounded on mere conjecture and
speculation. In re MJU 965 P.2d at 556; Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997). In
this case, the Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice was based on nothing more than rank
speculation, legal conclusions, and adverse rulings.
1.

The Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice Was Premised on Mere
Speculation and Legal Conclusions.

In this case, the Spaffords filed their Motion to Disqualify immediately after the
District Court orally ruled on GCU's summary judgment motion and certain related
motions. (R. 1155-1232.) The plain language of the Affidavit of Prejudice itself
demonstrates that the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was based on nothing more than
rank speculation and unfounded legal conclusions. (R. 1156-1231.) By way of example
only, Mr. Spafford claimed that the Spaffords' objection to the form of the Order
Extending Dispositive Motion cutoff "should have legally and properly triggered a
hearing, either at plaintiffs' request or on the court's own motion." (R. 1157.) In
addition, the Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice makes conclusory statements respecting
the Spaffords' alleged oral stipulation to an "open-ended" extension of all deadlines and
the legal requirements for notices of hearing before the District Court. (R. 1158-59.)
In addition, GCU notes that the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was based on
nothing more than the Spaffords' own recollection of the proceedings, and did not refer
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to, let alone attach, any portion of the official record of proceedings before Judge
Medley. (R. 1156-1240.) Indeed, the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was based on
nothing more than the Spaffords' biased and conclusory characterization of the court
record. See Poulsen, 946 P.2d at 743 n. 2 (party seeking disqualification had failed to
meet its burden where it failed to provide the entire record of the transcript below).
2.

The Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify Provided No Evidence of Bias
Stemming from an Extrajudicial Source.

The reviewing judge's denial of the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was not error
because the Spaffords' allegations of prejudice do not demonstrate any bias stemming
from a source outside of these judicial proceedings. "The extrajudicial source rule
provides that statements and rulings by a judge during court proceedings generally cannot
form the basis for disqualification unless those words or actions are 'extreme' and reflect
c

a deep-seated antagonism toward the party requesting recusal." Binks v. Maughan, 2009

UT App 321 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (quoting In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct. App.
1998)). "[0]rdinarily, when a judge's words or actions are motivated by events
originating within the context of judicial proceedings, they are insulated from charges of
bias." U.S. v. Nickl 427 F.3d 1286, 1298 (10th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court of Utah
quoted the following passage from a treatise on the subject to the same effect:
The traditional judicial view is that if a judge can be
disqualified for bias following comment or ruling during the
court proceedings, there is no limit to disqualification motions
and there would be a return to 'judge shopping.' Any judicial
comment or ruling gives the appearance of partiality in the
broadest sense to the adversely effected party.
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Madsen v. Prudential Fed, Savings & Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 546 (Utah 1988); see
also In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 2003 UT 35, U 7, 81 P-3d 758 (claimed bias or
prejudice "must usually stem from an 'extrajudicial source,' not from occurrences in
proceedings before the judge.")
The Spaffords Affidavit of Prejudice did not allege any bias or prejudice
originating from a source outside of the proceedings before Judge Medley. (R. 11561231.) Accordingly, even if the Affidavit of Prejudice were accepted at face value, the
Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was properly denied.
VIII. THE SPAFFORDS' BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE IT
VIOLATES RULE 24.
As set forth above, the Spaffords'Brief contains scandalous accusations,
unsupported by the record, that violate Utah R. App. P. 24(k). These include the
Spaffords' unfounded claim that GCU acted as an advocate for the District Court and that
GCU made filings with the sole intention of "abusfing] process" in a "transparent effort
to curry favor with the trial court." (Appellants' Brief, 30.) Needless to say, there is no
support for these baseless accusations in the record. In addition, the Spaffords, without
any evidence or foundation, accuse the District Court of ignoring the merits of this matter
and instead "act[ing] out of expediency, seemingly to clear its case load." (Appellants'
Brief, 57.)
As this Court is aware, the Spaffords filed their initial brief in this matter on July
12, 2010. On July 27, 2010, GCU moved to strike that brief on the grounds that it
improperly set forth scandalous matters and lacked required citations to the appellate
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record. On August 19, 2010, this Court granted GCU's motion to strike, ordering the
Spaffords to file a brief that complied with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure within
twenty days. (Order Entered August 19, 2010.) In addition, this Court included in its
order a notation that if "the Spaffords file an amended brief but the brief is not in
compliance with the rules of appellate procedure, the brief will be stricken and their
appeal will be dismissed." (Id.) Despite this Court's admonition, the Spaffords have
continued to disregard the requirements of Rule 24(k).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's Judgment and Order should be
upheld. In addition, the ruling of the Associate Presiding Judge with respect to the
Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify should be affirmed.
DATED this 12th day of October 2010.

-awe
Matthe\k L. Moncur
BALLARD SPAHR

LLP

Attorneys for Granite CredifUnion
\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct of copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE was served to the following this 12th day of October 2010, in the manner
set forth below:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

Iris M. Spafford
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121
Earl S. Spafford
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121
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WAYNE LEE, SR., VERSUS CENTRAL GULF TOWING, L.L.C. ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-1497 SECTION "KM (2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25773

December 8, 2004, Decided
December 9, 2004, Filed; December 9, 2004, Entered
DISPOSITION:
[*1] Defendant's motion to compel
plaintiffs deposition granted and plaintiffs motion to
compel denied

COUNSEL: For WAYNE LEE, SR, plaintiff George
Warren Byrne, Jr, Randy Jay Ungar, Kristi Ann Post,
Gregory T Discon, Ungar & Byrne, New Orleans, LA
For CENTRAL GULF TOWING, L L C , DUARD
EYMARD TOWING, L L C , CLARENDON AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, defendants Patrick J
McShane, Danica Colleen Benbow, Fnlot, Partridge,
Kohnke & Clements, LC, New Orleans, LA
JUDGES: JOSEPH C WILKINSON, JR, UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

filed timely opposition memoranda Record Doc Nos
24 28
At the request [*2] of counsel for defendants, oral
argument was conducted concerning defendant's motion
on December 8, 2004 Participating were Kristi Post,
representing plaintiff, and Patrick McShane, representing
defendants Because both motions concern the conduct
of plaintiffs ongoing deposition, I considered them together and conducted oral argument as to both motions at
the December 8th hearing
Having considered the complaint, the record, the
submissions of the parties, the representations of counsel
at oral argument and the applicable law, and for the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to compel plaintiffs deposition is GRANTFD and
plaintiffs motion to compel is DENIED for the following
reasons

OPINION BY: JOSEPH C WILKINSON, JR
I PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
OPINION
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Wayne Lee, Sr, brought this personal injury action under the Jones Act and general maritime law
against defendants Central Gulf Towing, L L C and Duard Eymard Towing, L L C Two motions are currently
pending before me (1) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel,
Record Doc No 20, which seeks the production to
plaintiff of his post-accident statement and a surveillance
video, both of which were apparently obtained by defendant's agents, and (2) Defendants' Motion to Compel
Deposition of Plaintiff, Record Doc No 25 Both parties

It is my often-expressed opinion that Fifth Circuit
case law and the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly and unambiguously require the production
of a party's statement and surveillance materials before
that party's deposition, when those materials have been
requested m discovery and in the absence of a showing
of good cause to withhold them Concerning a party's
[*3] statements, see "Vinet v F & L Marine Mgmt "
2004 U S Dist LEXIS 26356, C A No 04-594 "L"(2)
Record Doc No 17 (ED La April 29, 2004)(citing,
among other things, Fed R Civ P 26(b)(3), Miles v
M/V Mississippi Queen 753 F 2d 1349, 1350-53, (5th
Cir 1985) (Judge Rubin explaining in Miles that the
Rule 26(b)(3) requirement that a party's statement be
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produced upon request is "mandatory, not discretionary,"
that this "court's refusal to order production of the [plaintiffs] statements was erroneous," and that "[a] rule intended to prevent trial by ambush and to further adequate
pretrial preparation has been violated
A district
court's failure to abide by the literal dictate of the rule is
clearly error and we so hold ")) Concerning surveillance
film, see "Karr v Four Seasons Mar, Ltd," 2004 U S
Dist LEXIS 6388, C A No 02-3413 T'(2), Record
Doc No 74, 2004 WL 797728 (ED La April 12,
2004)(citmg, among other things, Chiasson v Zapata
Gulf Marine Corp, 988 F 2d 513, 517 (5th Cir 1993))
To my knowledge, there is currently no "general practice
in this district" permitting the withholding of these materials in response to discovery requests until [*4] after
the party's deposition, but even if there were, it would be
contrary to the binding authorities cited above
Thus, except for one peculiar but overriding and important circumstance in this case, I would require the
production of both the statement of plaintiff and the surveillance materials, the latter of which I have reviewed in
camera, for the reasons discussed in my previous opinions cited above That compelling, significant circumstance is that counsel jointly agreed to a different procedure concerning these depositions
As both counsel made clear at oral argument, an
agreement was made between defense and plaintiffs
counsel that both the statement and the surveillance film
would be withheld from production until after completion of plaintiffs deposition Ordinarily, such an agreement must be by written stipulation, Fed R Civ P 29,
which provides in pertinent part "Unless otherwise directed by the court, the parties may by written stipulation
(1) provide that depositions may be taken
at any time
or place
and in any manner
, and (2) modify other
procedures governing
discovery " The self-evident
purpose of this rule is to encourage agreed-upon, [*5]
lawyer-managed discovery and to eliminate the cost,
effort and expense involved in court intervention in discovery through motion practice No such written stipulation was executed in this case The purpose of requiring
written stipulations is to eliminate the possibility of confusion and disagreement between counsel as to what was
agreed upon In this case, however, there is no confusion
or disagreement At oral argument, plaintiffs counsel
conceded, as defense counsel had argued in his motion
papers, that an agreement was in fact reached between
counsel that plaintiffs deposition would be taken before
production of the statement and the surveillance materials
The orderly and efficient conduct of discovery depends to a large extent on the cooperation of counsel,
who must be able to rely upon the agreements they make
An agreement was reached in this case, and there is no

confusion or uncertainty about it Even though the
agreement was not one required by the applicable rules
and case law, it was an agreement nonetheless of the type
permitted and even encouraged by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and I will enforce it in this instance
Thus, plaintiffs motion is denied
[*6]
II DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL
DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF
In this motion, defendants seek to compel plaintiff to
answer deposition questions concerning photographs of
certain steps aboard a sister vessel to the vessel on which
plaintiffs alleged injuries occurred Defendants represent
that the steps aboard the vessel where the alleged accident happened were removed and neither the steps nor
photographs of them are available Plaintiffs counsel
instructed plaintiff not to answer these questions during
the deposition In his opposition memorandum, plaintiff
argues that questions about the steps aboard a sister vessel as opposed to the vessel on which he was injured, are
irrelevant
The instruction not to answer these questions during
the deposition was not well-founded Fed R Civ P
30(d)(1) permits counsel to instruct a witness not to answer on only three grounds, none of which were present
in this instance Moreover, plaintiffs relevance objection
is overruled Discovery is not trial Permitting use of
these photographs in a discovery deposition does not
mean that either they or the deposition testimony will be
admissible at trial Because neither the steps nor [*7]
any photographs of the steps from the subject vessel are
available, photographs from its sister vessel are an acceptable alternative option for use during deposition
questioning, in the nature of use of a demonstrative aid,
for inquiring into how the alleged accident occurred and
in that sense their use at a deposition is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
Fed R Civ P 26(b)(1) Plaintiff is, of course, free during his deposition testimony to point out any differences
or similarities between the pictured steps and those involved in his accident, and the record must be made clear
during questioning that the pictured steps are not the
steps where the accident occurred
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff must answer
these questions when his deposition resumes
III REQUESTS FOR AWARDS OF FEES AND EXPENSES
Both sides have requested awards of attorney's fees
and expenses incurred in connection with these motions
Both requests are denied Although defendants are the
winners as to both motions, the law supports plaintiffs
arguments in support of his motion to compel, and only
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the agreement between counsel compels the result
reached. [*8] Plaintiffs opposition to defendant's motion is a good faith argument concerning the facts and the
law. Under these circumstances, no award of fees and
costs will be made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A).
***

date at the office of plaintiffs counsel, following which
defendants must produce both the statement and the surveillance materials to plaintiff.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of December,
2004.
JOSEPH C, WILKINSON, JR.

Counsel are directed to schedule the continuation of
plaintiffs deposition at a mutually convenient time and

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

